In privacy amplification, two mutually trusted parties aim to amplify the secrecy of an initial shared secret X in order to establish a shared private key K by exchanging messages over an insecure communication channel. If the channel is authenticated the task can be solved in a single round of communication using a strong randomness extractor; choosing a quantum-proof extractor allows one to establish security against quantum adversaries.
Introduction
Privacy amplification. We study the problem of privacy amplification [BBR88, Mau92, BBCM95, MW97] (PA). In this problem, two parties, Alice and Bob, share a weak secret X (having min-entropy at least k). Using X and an insecure communication channel, Alice and Bob would like to securely agree on a secret key R that is ǫ-close to uniformly random even to an adversary Eve who may have full control over their communication channel. This elegant problem has multiple applications including biometric authentication, leakage-resilient cryptography, and quantum cryptography.
If the adversary Eve is passive, i.e., she is only able to observe the communication but may not alter the messages exchanged, then there is a direct solution based on the use of a strong seeded randomness extractor Ext [NZ96] . This can be done by Alice selecting a uniform seed Y for the extractor, and sending the seed to Bob; Alice and Bob both compute the key R = Ext(X, Y ), which is close to being uniformly random and independent of Y by the strong extractor property. The use of a quantum-proof extractor suffices to protect against adversaries holding quantum side information about the secret X.
Privacy amplification is substantially more challenging when the adversary is active, i.e. Eve can not only read but also modify messages exchanged across the communication channel. This problem has been studied extensively [MW97, RW03, DKK + 12, DW09, CKOR10, DLWZ14, CRS12, Li12c, Li12a, Li12b, DY13, ADJ + 14, Li15, CGL15, Coh15, AHL16, Li17], yielding constructions that are optimal in any of the parameters involved in the problem, including the min-entropy k, the error ǫ, and the communication complexity of the protocol.
Active adversaries with quantum side information. We consider the problem of active attacks by quantum adversaries. This question arises naturally when privacy amplification is used as a sub-protocol, e.g., as a post-processing step in quantum key distribution (QKD), when it may not be safe to assume that the classical communication channel is authenticated.
1 To the best of our knowledge the question was first raised in [BF11] , whose primary focus is privacy amplification with an additional property of source privacy. Although the authors of [BF11] initially claimed that their construction is secure against quantum side information, they later realized that there was an issue with their argument, and withdrew their claim of quantum security. The only other work we are aware of approaching the question of privacy amplification in the presence of active quantum adversaries is a paper by one of us [CV16] . In this paper it is shown that a classical protocol for PA introduced by Dodis and Wichs [DW09] remains secure against active quantum attacks when the main tool used in the protocol, a non-malleable extractor, is secure against quantum side information (a notion that is also formally introduced in that paper, and to which we return shortly). Unfortunately, the final contribution of [CV16] , a construction of a quantum-proof non-malleable extractor, also had a flaw in the proof, invalidating the construction. Thus, the problem of quantum-secure active privacy amplification remained open.
It may be useful to discuss the difficulty faced by both these previous works, as it informed our own construction. The issue is related to the modeling of the side information held by the adversary Eve, and how that side information evolves as messages are being exchanged, and possibly modified, throughout the privacy amplification protocol. To explain this, consider the setting for a non-malleable extractor. Here, Alice initially has a secret X (the source), while Eve holds side information E, a quantum state, correlated with X. Alice selects a uniformly random seed Y and computes Ext(X, Y ). However, in addition to receiving Y (as would already be the case for a strong randomness extractor), Eve is also given the possibility to select an arbitrary Y ′ = Y and receive Ext(X, Y ′ ) as "advice" to help her break the extractor -i.e., distinguish Ext(X, Y ) from uniform. Now, clearly in any practical scenario the adversary may use her side information E in order to guide her choice of Y ′ ; thus Y ′ should be considered as the outcome of a measurement {M y ′ y }, depending on Y = y and performed on E, which returns an outcome Y ′ = y ′ and a post-measurement state E ′ . This means that the security of the extractor should be considered with respect to the side information E ′ . But due to the measurement, E ′ may be correlated with both X and Y in a way that cannot be addressed by standard techniques for the analysis of strong extractors. Indeed, even if E ′ is classical, so that we can condition on its value, X and Y may not be independent after conditioning on E ′ = e ′ ; due to the lack of independence it is unclear whether extraction works.
The issue seems particularly difficult to accommodate when analyzing extractors based on the technique of "alternate extraction", as was attempted in [BF11, CV16] . In fact, in the original version of [BF11] the issue is overlooked, resulting in a flawed security proof. In [CV16] the authors attempted to deal with the difficulty by using the formalism of quantum Markov chains; unfortunately, there is a gap in the argument and it does not seem like the scenario can be modeled using the Markov chain formalism. Note that in the classical setting the issue does not arise: having fixed E = e we can consider Y ′ to be a fixed, deterministic function of Y -there is no E ′ to consider, and X is independent of both Y and Y ′ conditioned on E = e. In this paper we do not address the issue, but instead focus on a specific construction of non-malleable extractor whose security can be shown by algebraic techniques sidestepping the difficulty; we explain our approach in more detail below.
Our results. We show that a non-malleable extractor introduced by Li [Li12c] in the classical setting is secure against quantum side information. Combining this construction with the protocol of Dodis and Wichs and its proof of security from [CV16] , we obtain the first protocol for privacy amplification that is secure against active quantum adversaries.
Before describing our results in more detail we summarize Li's construction and its analysis for the case of classical side information. The construction is based on the inner product function. Let p be a prime, F p the finite field with p elements, and ·, · the inner product over F p . Consider the function Ext : F n p × F n p → F p given by Ext(X, Y ) := X, Y , where X ∈ F n p is a weak secret with min-entropy (conditioned on the adversary's side information) assumed to be greater than (n log p)/2, and Y is a uniformly random and independent seed. For this function to be a non-malleable extractor, it is required that Ext(X, Y ) is close to uniform and independent of Ext(X, f (Y )), where f is any adversarially chosen function such that f (Y ) = Y for all Y . This is clearly not true, since if f (Y ) = cY for some c ∈ F p \ {1}, then Ext(X, f (Y )) = cExt(X, Y ), and hence we don't get the desired independence. Thus, for such a construction to work, it is necessary to encode the source Y as Enc(Y ), for a well-chosen function Enc, in such a way that X, Enc(Y ) − c · X, Enc(f (Y )) is hard to guess. The non-uniform XOR lemma [CRS12, AHL16] shows that it is sufficient to show that X,
is close to uniform conditioned on Y and E. The encoding that we use in this paper (which is almost the same as the encoding chosen by Li) is to take Y ∈ F n/2 p , and encode it as Y Y 2 , which we view as an n-character string over F p , with the symbol denoting concatenation of strings and the square taken by first interpreting Y as an element of F p n/2 . Then it is not difficult to show that for any function f such that f (Y ) = Y and any c, we have that
2 ) (taking the addition coordinatewise) has min-entropy almost (n log p)/2. Thus, provided X has sufficiently high min-entropy and using the fact that
2 ) are independent conditioned on E, the strong extractor property of the inner product function gives the desired result.
Our main technical result is a proof of security of Li's extractor, against quantum side information. We show the following (we refer to Definition 10 for the formal definition of a quantum-proof non-malleable extractor): Theorem 1. Let p = 2 be a prime. Let n be an even integer. Then for any ǫ > 0 the function nmExt(X, Y ) :
2 is an ( n 2 + 6 log p−1+4 log 1 ǫ , ǫ) quantum-proof non-malleable extractor. We give the main ideas behind our proof of security for this construction, highlighting the points of departure from the classical analysis. Subsequently, we explain the application to privacy amplification.
Proof ideas. We begin by generalizing the first step of Li's argument, the reduction provided by the non-uniform XOR lemma, to the quantum case. An XOR lemma with quantum side information is already shown in [KK12] , where the lemma is used to show security of the inner product unction as a two-source extractor against quantum side information. This version is not sufficient for our purposes, and we establish the following generalization, which may be of independent interest (we refer to Section 3 for additional background and definitions):
Lemma 2. Let p be a prime power and t an integer. Let ρ X0XE be a ccq state with X 0 ∈ F p and X = (X 1 , . . . ,
XOR lemmas are typically proved via Fourier-based techniques (including the one in [KK12] ). Here we instead rely on a collision probability-based argument inspired from [AHL16] . We prove Lemma 2 by observing that such arguments generalize to the quantum setting, as in the proof of the quantum leftover hash lemma in [TSSR11] .
Based on the XOR lemma (used with t = 1), following Li's arguments it remains to show that the random
, is close to uniformly distributed from the adversary's point of view, specified by side information E ′ , for every c = 0 ∈ F p . As already mentioned earlier, this cannot be shown by a reduction to the security proof of the inner product function as a twosource extractor against side information, as X and g(Y, Y ′ ) are not independent (not even conditioned on the value of E ′ when E ′ is classical). Instead, we are led to a more direct analysis which proceeds by formulating the problem as a communication task. 3 We relate the task of breaking our construction -distinguishing X, g(Y, Y ′ ) from uniformto success in the following task. Alice is given access to a random variable X, and Bob is given a uniformly random Y . Alice is allowed to send a quantum message E, correlated to X, to Bob. Bob then selects a Y ′ = Y and returns a value b ∈ F p . The players win if b = X, g(Y, Y ′ ) . Based on our previous reductions it suffices to show that no strategy can succeed with probability substantially higher than random in this game, unless Alice's initial message to Bob contains a large amount of information about X; more precisely, unless the min-entropy of X, conditioned on E, is less than half the length of X.
Note that the problem as we formulated it does not fall in standard frameworks for communication complexity. In particular, it is a relation problem, as Bob is allowed to choose the value Y ′ to which his convenient to work with a prime field. 3 The correspondence between security of quantum-proof strong extractors and communication problems has been used repeatedly before, see e.g. [GKK + 07, KK12]. prediction b applies. This seems to prevent us from using any prior results on the communication complexity of the inner product function, and we develop an ad-hoc proof which may be of independent interest. We approach the problem using the "reconstruction paradigm" (used in e.g. [DPVR12] ), which amounts to showing that from any successful strategy of the players one may construct a measurement for Bob which completely "reconstructs" X, given E; if this can be achieved with high enough probability it will contradict the min-entropy assumption on X, via its dual formulation as a guessing probability [KRS09] . We show this by running Bob's strategy "in superposition", and applying a Fourier transform to recover a guess for X. This argument is similar to one introduced in [CvDNT99, NS06] . We refer to Section 4.1 for more detail.
Application to privacy amplification. Finally we discuss the application of our quantum-proof nonmalleable extractor to the problem of privacy amplification against active quantum attacks, which is our original motivation. The application is based on a breakthrough result by Dodis and Wichs [DW09] , who were first to show the existence of a two-round PA protocol with optimal (up to constant factors) entropy loss L = Θ(log(1/ǫ)), for any initial min-entropy k. This was achieved by defining and showing the existence of non-malleable extractors with very good parameters.
The protocol from [DW09] is recalled in Section 5. The protocol proceeds as follows. Alice sends a uniformly random seed Y to Bob over the communication channel, which is controlled by Eve. Bob receives a possibly modified seed Y ′ . Then Alice computes a key K = nmExt(X, Y ), and Bob computes
In the second round, Bob generates another uniformly random seed W ′ , and sends W ′ together with
to Alice, where MAC is a one-time message authentication code. Alice receives a possibly modified T, W and checks whether T = MAC K (W ). If yes, then the shared secret between Alice and Bob is Ext(X, W ) = Ext(X, W ′ ) with overwhelming probability, where Ext is any strong seeded extractor.
The security of this protocol intuitively follows from the following simple observation. If the adversary does not modify Y , then K ′ = K, and so W ′ must be equal to W by the security of the MAC. If Y ′ = Y , then by the non-malleability property of nmExt, K is uniform and independent of K ′ , and so it is impossible for the adversary to predict MAC K (W ) for any W even given K ′ and W ′ . Since [DW09] could not construct an explicit non-malleable extractor, they instead defined and constructed a so called a look-ahead extractor, which can be seen as a weakening of the non-malleability requirement of a non-malleable extractor. This was done by using the alternating extraction protocol by Dziembowski and Pietrzak [DP07] .
In [CV16] , Dodis and Wichs' reduction is extended to the case of quantum side information, provided that the non-malleable Extractor nmExt used in the protocol satisfies the approriate definition of quantum non-malleability, and Ext is a strong quantum-proof extractor. Based on our construction of a quantumproof non-malleable extractor (Theorem 1) we immediately obtain a PA protocol that is secure as long as the initial secret X has a min-entropy rate of (slightly more than) half. The result is formalized as Corollary 27 in Section 5.
Future work. There have been a series of works in the classical setting [DLWZ14, CRS12, Li12c, Li12a, DY13, Li15, CGL15, Coh15, AHL16, Li17] that have given privacy amplification protocols (via constructing non-malleable extractors or otherwise) that achieve near-optimal parameters. In particular, Li [Li17] constructed a non-malleable extractor that works for min-entropy k = Ω(log n + log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)), where ǫ is the error probability.
Our quantum-proof non-malleable extractor requires the min-entropy rate of the initial weak secret to be larger than 1/2. We leave it as an open question whether one of the above-mentioned protocols that work for min-entropy rate smaller than 1/2 in the classical setting can be shown secure against quantum side information.
Preliminaries

Notation
For p a prime power we let F p denote the finite field with p elements. For any positive integer n, there is a natural bijection φ : F n p → F p n that preserves group addition and scalar multiplication, i.e., the following hold:
• For all c ∈ F p , and for all
• For all
We use this bijection to define the square of an element in F n p , e.g. for y ∈ F n p
We write ·, · for the inner product over F n p . log denotes the logarithm with base 2. We write H for an arbitrary finite-dimensional Hilbert space, L(H) for the linear operators on H, Pos(H) for positive semidefinite operators, and D(H) ⊂ Pos(H) for positive semidefinite operators of trace 1 (density
, and trace-preserving. We use capital letters A, B, E, X, Y, Z, . . . to denote quantum or classical random variables. Generally, the letters near the beginning of the alphabet, such as A, B, E, represent quantum variables (density matrices on a finite-dimensional Hilbert space), while the letters near the end, such as X, Y, Z represent classical variables (ranging over a finite alphabet). We sometimes represent classical random variables as density matrices diagonal in the computational basis, and write e.g. (A, B, . . . , E) ρ for the density matrix ρ A,B,...,E . For a quantum random variable A, we denote H A the Hilbert space on which the associated density matrix ρ A is supported, and d A its dimension. If X is classical we loosely identify its range {0, . . . , d X − 1} with the space H X spanned by {|0 X , . . . , |d X − 1 X }. We denote I A the identity operator on H A . When a density matrix specifies the states of two random variables, one of which is classical and the other is quantum, we call it a classical-quantum(cq)-state. A cq state (X, E) ρ takes the form
where the summation is over all x in the range of X and {ρ x E } are positive semidefinite matrices with Tr ρ x E = p x , where p x is the probability of getting the outcome x when measuring the X register. Similarly, a ccq state (X, Y, E) σ is a density matrix over two classical variables and one quantum variable, e.g. σ XY E = x,y |x x| X ⊗ |y y| Y ⊗ σ xy E . We will sometimes add or remove random variables from an already-specified density matrix. When we omit a random variable, we mean the reduced density matrix, e.g. (Y, E) σ = Tr X (σ XY E ). When we introduce a classical variable, we meant that the classical variable is computed into another classical register. For example, for a function
where δ(·, ·) is the Kronecker delta function, and the summation over f is taken over the range of F . When F is a random function, the density matrix is averaged over the appropriate probability distribution.
We use U Σ to denote the uniform distribution over a set Σ. For m-bit string {0, 1} m , we abbreviate U {0,1} m as U m . For a classical random variable X, U X denote the uniform distribution over the range of X.
For p ≥ 1 we write · p for the Schatten p-norm (for a normal matrix, this is the p-norm of the vector of singular values). We write · for the operator norm.
We write ≈ ǫ to denote that two density matrices are ǫ-close to each other in trace distance. For example,
Note that in case both X and E are classical random variables, this reduces to the statistical distance.
Quantum information
The min-entropy of a classical random variable X conditioned on quantum side information E is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Min-entropy). Let ρ XE ∈ D(H X ⊗ H E ) be a cq state. The min-entropy of X conditioned on E is defined as
When the state ρ with respect to which the entropy is measured is clear from context we simply write
It is often convenient to consider the smooth min-entropy, which is obtained by maximizing the minentropy over all cq states in an ǫ-neighborhood of ρ XE . The definition of this neighborhood depends on a choice of metric; the canonical choice is the "purified distance". Since this choice will not matter for us we defer to [?] for a precise definition.
where B(ρ XE , ǫ) is the ball of radius ǫ around ρ XE , taken with respect to the purified distance.
Rather than using Definition 3, we will most often rely on an operational expression for the min-entropy stated in the following lemma from [KRS09] .
Lemma 6 (Min-entropy and guessing probability). For a cq state ρ XE ∈ D(H X ⊗ H E ), the guessing probability is defined as the probability to correctly guess X with the optimal strategy to measure E, i.e.
where {M x } is a positive operator-valued measure (POVM) on H E . Then the guessing probability is related to the min-entropy by
Extractors
We first give the definition of a strong quantum-proof extractor. Recall the notation
and U m for a random variable uniformly distributed over m-bit strings. Definition 7. Let k be an integer and ǫ ≥ 0. A function Ext :
There are known explicit constructions of strong quantum-proof extractors.
Theorem 8 ([TSSR11]
). For any integers d X , k and for any ǫ > 0 there exists an explicit strong (k, ǫ) quantum-proof extractor Ext: {0, . . .
We use the same definition of non-malleable extractor against quantum side information that was introduced in the work [CV16] . The definition is a direct generalization of the classical notion of non-malleable extractor introduced in [DW09] . The first step is to extend the notion that the adversary may query the extractor on any different seed Y ′ than the seed Y actually used to the case where Y ′ may be generated from Y as well as quantum side information held by the adversary.
Definition 9 (Map with no fixed points). Let H Y , H E and H E ′ denote finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. We say that a CPTP map
and all computational basis states |y ∈ H Y it holds that
The following definition is given in [CV16] :
in ancilla registers and tracing out X.
Hölder's inequality
We use the following Hölder's inequality for matrices. For a proof, see e.g. [Bha97] .
Lemma 11 (Hölder's inequality). For any n × n matrices A, B, C with complex entries, and real numbers r, s, t > 0 satisfying
3 Quantum XOR lemma
In this section we prove two XOR lemmas with quantum side information. First we prove a more standard version, Lemma 13, in Section 3.1. We prove a non-uniform version, Lemma 2, in Section 3.2. Lemma 13 is not actually used in the analysis of our non-malleable extractor, but we include it as a warm-up to our non-uniform XOR lemma. Since XOR lemmas often play a fundamental role, both lemma might be of independent interest. The proofs are based on quantum collision probability techniques 4 from [TSSR11] to transform a classical collision probability-based proof into one that also allows for quantum side information. When restricted to F 2 , our standard XOR lemma, Lemma 13, is very similar to Lemma 10 of [KK12] , although the result from [KK12] provides a tighter bound in this case.
5 However our result applies to F p , while it is unclear whether the proof of [KK12] generalizes to p > 2. Our result is based on the use of the collision probability, while [KK12] uses Fourier analysis. The idea of non-uniform XOR lemma is natural in the context of non-malleable extractors, and has been explored in [Li12c, CRS12, AHL16] . Our non-uniform XOR lemma generalizes a restricted version of Lemma 3.15 of [Li12c] to F p with quantum side information.
6
The quantum collision probability is defined as follows.
Definition 12 (Quantum collision probability). Let ρ AB ∈ D(H A ⊗ H B ) and σ B ∈ D(H B ). The collision probability of ρ AB , conditioned on σ B , is defined as
where σ B ∈ D(H B ).
A careful reader might notice that Γ c ≤ 1 is not generally true, so calling Γ c collision probability seems misleading. We give a general definition which allows arbitrary states ρ AB and σ B to match the existing literature, but here we always consider cq states ρ AB and take σ B = ρ B . We prove in Corollary 15 that Γ c ≤ 1 in such cases. Γ c (ρ AB |σ B ) also reduces to the classical collision probability when both of A, B are classical and σ B = ρ B .
We will often use the following relation, also taken from [TSSR11] , valid for any ρ AB ∈ D(H A ⊗ H B ):
which can be verified by expanding the square:
Standard quantum XOR lemma
In this section, we prove our quantum generalization of the standard XOR lemma, Lemma 13, which roughly states that given a random variable X ∈ F t p , if a, X is close to uniform for all a = 0, then X is close to uniform.
Lemma 13 (XOR lemma). Let p be a prime power, t an integer and ǫ ≥ 0. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X t ) ∈ F t p be a classical random variable, and E some correlated quantum variable. For all a = (a 1 , . . . , a t 
To prove Lemma 13, we bound the collision probability as a function of the trace distance in Lemma 16. To prove Lemma 16 we use the following lemma for "conditioned" cq states.
Lemma 16 (Bounding collision probability with trace distance). Let ρ XE be a cq state. If
Proof. The first inequality follows from Lemma 4 of [TSSR11], we repeat it here for completeness. We use Hölder's inequality (Lemma 11) with r = t = 4, s = 2, A = C = I X ⊗ ρ 1/4 E , and
This leads to
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 13. The proof idea is to start from the trace distance of X to uniform, apply Lemma 16 to get an upper bound in terms of the collision probability of X, apply Eq. (3.2) and expand the square to express the collision probability of X in terms of the collision probability of a, X , and finally apply Lemma 16 again to get an upper bound in terms of the trace distance of a, X to uniform.
Lemma 13 (restated). Let p be a prime power, t an integer and ǫ ≥ 0. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X t ) ∈ F t p be a classical random variable, and E some correlated quantum variable. For all a = (a 1 , . . . , a t 
(3.14)
Proof. Note that
We start by relating the collision probability of Z and X. Using Eq. (3.2),
Averaging over a ∈ F t p , we get:
Dividing both sides by 1 − 1 p gives
Having the most computational-heavy step done, we put the pieces together to prove our XOR lemma.
On the first line we use Lemma 16, the second line we use Eq. (3.18), and the fourth line we use Lemma 16 and Corollary 15. Dividing both sides by 4 and taking the square root, we get the desired result
(3.20)
Non-uniform XOR lemma
Our non-uniform XOR lemma bounds the distance to uniform of a ccq state, a state with two classical registers and one quantum register. Roughly speaking, the lemma states that given two random variables X 0 ∈ F p and X ∈ F t p , if X 0 + a, X is close to uniform, then X 0 is close to uniform given X.
Lemma 2 (restated). Let p be a prime power, t an integer and ǫ ≥ 0. Let ρ X0XE be a ccq state with X 0 ∈ F p and X = (X 1 , . . . , X t ) ∈ F t p . For all a = (a 1 , . . . , a t ) ∈ F t p , define a random variable
The proof of the non-uniform XOR lemma follows the same structure as the proof of the standard XOR lemma in Section 3.1: we bound the collision probability by the trace distance in Lemma 18, then prove the non-uniform XOR lemma based on that. First we establish the analogue of Eq. (3.2) for any ccq state ρ XZE :
Similar to Lemma 14, we need the following lemma to bound the collision probability by the trace distance in Lemma 18.
Lemma 17. Let ρ XZE be a ccq state. Then
This proves the first inequality. We also have
This proves the second inequality.
We then bound the collision probability by the trace distance as in Lemma 16.
Lemma 18 (Bounding collision probability with trace distance, non-uniform). Let ρ XZE be a ccq state. If
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 16. For the first inequality, we use Hölder's inequality (Lemma 11) with r = t = 4, s = 2, A = C = I XZ ⊗ρ
1/4
E , and B = I XZ ⊗ ρ
where we used Eq. (3.22) in the last line. Squaring both sides and dividing by d X d Z , we get the desired inequality. For the second inequality, we use Lemma 17 to show that
Starting with Eq. (3.22), we have
where we used Eq. (3.30) on the fourth line.
Now we restate and prove the non-uniform XOR lemma. The proof idea is to start from the trace distance of X 0 given X to uniform, apply Lemma 18 to get an upper bound in terms of the collision probability of X 0 given X, apply Eq. (3.22) and expand the square to express the collision probability of X 0 given X in terms of the collision probability of X 0 + a, X , and finally apply Lemma 18 again to get an upper bound in terms of the trace distance of X 0 + a, X to uniform.
Lemma 2 (restated). Let p be a prime power, t an integer and ǫ ≥ 0. Let ρ X0XE be a ccq state with X 0 ∈ F p and X = (X 1 , . . . ,
Proof. We start by relating the collision probability of Z and X 0 + a, X :
When we average over a, the last term vanishes,
With the heavy work done, we put everything together and prove the lemma and take a square root, we get the desired result:
4 Quantum-Proof Non-malleable Extractor
In this section we introduce our non-malleable extractor and prove its security. The extractor was first considered by Li [Li12c] . We use the symbol for concatenation of strings, and for a, b ∈ F n p write a, b for the standard inner product over F n p .
Definition 19 (Inner product-based non-malleable extractor). Let p = 2 be a prime. For any even integer n, define a function nmExt :
where Y 2 is defined as in Section 2.1. 
A communication game
Let p = 2 be a prime. Let n be an even integer, and g : F 2. Alice creates a cq state ρ XE , where X ∈ F n p , and sends the quantum register E to Bob.
Bob returns y
The players win if and only if b = x, g(y, y ′ ) and y ′ = y. The following lemma bounds the players' maximum success probability in this game as a function of the min-entropy of Alice's input X, conditioned on her message to Bob.
Lemma 20 (Success probability of the communication game). Suppose there exists a communication protocol for Alice and Bob in guess(n, p, g) that succeeds with probability at least y } y ′ ,b is projective, since Alice can send ancilla qubits along with ρ and allow Bob to apply Naimark's theorem to his POVM in order to obtain a projective measurement; this will change neither his success probability nor the min-entropy of Alice's state. By definition, the players' success probability in guess(n, p, g) is
(4.1)
y , where ω = e 
where for the second line we used that
Fix u = 0 that achieves the maximum in (4.2). For fixed y, define the map T y,u on H E by
T y,u has norm at most 1, since
For the second equality we used that {M y ′ ,b y } y ′ ,b is projective. Therefore we can complete T y,u into a unitary map by adding arbitrary, unused outcomes; for simplicity we'll assume T y,u itself is unitary.
Consider the following guessing strategy for an adversary holding side information ρ x E about x. The adversary first prepares a uniform superposition over y. Conditioned on y, it applies the map T y,u . It computes g(y, y ′ ) in an ancilla register, and erases (y, y ′ ), except for one bit of information r(y, y ′ ) ∈ {0, 1}, which specifies which pre-image (y, y ′ ) is, given g(y, y ′ ) (this is possible by the 2-to-1 assumption on g). The adversary applies a Fourier transform on the register containing g(y, y ′ ), using ω u = ω −u as primitive p-th root of unity (this is possible since u = 0 and p is prime). It measures the result and outputs it as a guess for x. Formally, the transformation this implements is
The adversary's success probability in guessing v = x on input ρ x E is therefore
where for the last line we used a 2 + b 2 ≥ 1 2 (a + b) 2 . Now, recall from (4.2) and our choice of u that
where the inequality is Cauchy-Schwarz. Comparing (4.4) and (4.5) gives
We conclude using that by Lemma 6, H min (X|E) ≤ − log p s .
Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we give the proof of Theorem 1. Towards this we first prove a preliminary lemma showing that a certain function, based on the definition of nmExt, has few collisions.
Lemma 21. Let p = 2 be a prime and n an even integer. For a ∈ F p define a function g a :
where y 2 is defined in Section 2.1. Then for any a ∈ F p , a = 0 and z ∈ F n p there are at most 2 distinct pairs (y, y ′ ) such that y ′ = y and g a (y, y ′ ) = z.
Proof. We use the bijection defined in Section 2.1 to interpret y and y ′ in F p n/2 . For a = 0, we fix an image g a = (c, d), where c, d are interpreted as elements of F p n/2 , and solve for (y,
Using (4.7) to eliminate y we get
Since (4.9) is a quadratic equation, there are at most two solutions unless all coefficients are zero. Since p = 2, −2 = 0. If all coefficients are zero, −2 = 0, and a = 0, then c = d = 0, a = −1, which implies y ′ = y by (4.7) and contradicts our assumption. So there are at most two different y ′ that can be mapped to (c, d). By (4.7) each y ′ corresponds to a unique y, so there are at most two pre-images.
We are ready to give the proof of Theorem 1. The proof depends on a simple lemma relating trace distance and guessing measurements, Lemma 22, which is stated and proved after the proof of the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem
Applying the XOR lemma, Lemma 2, with
and t = 1, (4.10) will follow once it is shown that
for all a ∈ F p . For a = 0, (4.11) follows from the fact that inner product is a quantum-proof two source extractor, which can be shown by the combination of Theorem 5.3 of [CLW14] and Lemma 1 in [LLTT05] .
For non-zero a ∈ F p , recall the function g a : F
where U X is the totally mixed state on X and ρ E = x ρ x E . Then there exists a POVM {M x } on ρ E such that
Proof. Since ρ XE is a cq state,
x be the projector onto the positive eigenvalues of ρ
by (4.14).
Privacy amplification
Dodis and Wichs [DW09] introduced a framework for constructing a two-message privacy amplification protocol from any non-malleable extractor. In [CV16] it is shown that the same framework, when instantiated with a quantum-proof non-malleable extractor nmExt as defined in Definition 10, leads to a protocol that is secure against active quantum adversaries. In Section 5.1 we recall the Dodis-Wichs protocol, and state the security guarantees that follow by plugging in our non-malleable extractor construction. The guarantees follows from the quantum extension of the Dodis-Wichs results in [CV16] ; since that work has not been published we include their results regarding the Dodis-Wichs protocol in Appendix A. In Section 5.2 we show that a different protocol for privacy amplification due to Dodis et al.
[DKK + 12], whose main advantage is of being a one-round protocol, is also quantum-proof. The construction and analysis of the protocol of [DKK + 12] is simple, with the drawback of a large entropy loss.
We start with the definition of a quantum-secure privacy amplification protocol against active adversaries. A privacy amplification protocol (P A , P B ) is defined as follows. The protocol is executed by two parties Alice and Bob sharing a secret X ∈ {0, 1} n , whose actions are described by P A , P B respectively. 7 In addition there is an active, computationally unbounded adversary Eve, who might have some quantum side information E correlated with X but satisfying H min (X|E) ρ ≥ k, where ρ XE denotes the initial state at beginning of the protocol.
Informally, the goal for the protocol is that whenever a party (Alice or Bob) does not reject, the key R output by this party is random and statistically independent of Eve's view. Moreover, if both parties do not reject, they must output the same keys R A = R B with overwhelming probability.
More formally, we assume that Eve is in full control of the communication channel between Alice and Bob, and can arbitrarily insert, delete, reorder or modify messages sent by Alice and Bob to each other. At the end of the protocol, Alice outputs a key R A ∈ {0, 1} m ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is a special symbol indicating rejection. Similarly, Bob outputs a key R B ∈ {0, 1} m ∪ {⊥}. The following definition generalizes the classical definition in [DLWZ11] .
Definition 23. Let k, m be integer and ǫ ≥ 0. A privacy amplification protocol (P A , P B ) is a (k, m, ǫ)-privacy amplification protocol secure against active quantum adversaries if it satisfies the following properties for any initial state ρ XE such that H min (X|E) ρ ≥ k, and where σ be the joint state of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of the protocol:
1. Correctness. If the adversary does not interfere with the protocol, then
2.
Robustness. This property comes in two flavors. The first is pre-application robustness, which states that even in the presence of an active adversary,
The second is post-application robustness, which is defined similarly, except the adversary is additionally given the key R A that is the result of the interaction (P A , P E ), and the key R B that results from the interaction (P E , P B ), where P E denotes the adversary's actions in its interaction with Alice and Bob.
3. Extraction. Given a string r ∈ {0, 1} m ∪ {⊥}, let purify(r) be a random variable on m-bit strings that is deterministically equal to ⊥ if r =⊥, and is otherwise uniformly distributed. Let V denotes the transcript of an execution of the protocol execution, and ρ E ′ the final quantum state possessed by Eve. Then the following should hold:
In other words, whenever a party does not reject, the party's key is indistinguishable from a fresh random string to the adversary.
The quantity k − m is called the entropy loss.
Dodis-Wichs protocol with non-malleable extractor
Here we first recall the Dodis-Wichs protocol for privacy amplification (hereafter called Protocol DW ), which is summarized in Figure 5 .1, and the required security definitions, taken from [CV16] . We then state the result obtained by instantiating the protocol with the quantum-proof non-malleable extractor from Theorem 1.
Protocol DW
t be a one-time ǫ MAC -information-theoretically secure message authentication code.
It is assumed that both parties, Alice and Bob, have access to a shared random variable X ∈ {0, . . . , d X −1}. Aside from the use of a strong quantum-proof extractor (Definition 7) and a quantum-proof non-malleable extractor (Definition 10), the protocol relies on an information-theoretically secure one-time message authentication codes, or MAC. This security notion is defined as follows.
t is an ǫ MAC -information-theoretically secure one-time message authentication code if for any function A : {0,
Efficient constructions of MAC satisfying the conditions of Definition 24 are known. The following proposition summarizes some parameters that are achievable using a construction based on polynomial evaluation.
MAC
, there exists an efficient family of ǫ MAC -information-theoretically secure one-time message authentication codes
The correctness and security requirements for the protocol are natural extensions of the classical case (see Definition 18 in [DW09] ). Informally, the adversary has the following control over the outcome of the protocol. First, it possess initial quantum side information E about the weak secret X shared by Alice and Bob. That is, it has a choice of a cq source ρ XE , under the condition that H min (X|E) is sufficiently large. Second, the adversary may intercept and modify any of the messages exchanged. In Protocol DW there are only two messages exchanged, Y A from Alice to Bob and (Y B , σ) from Bob to Alice. To each of these messages the adversary may apply an arbitrary transformation, that may depend on its side information E. We model the two possible attacks, one for each message, as CPTP maps
, where H denotes the Hilbert space associated with system E. Note that we may always assume that H is large enough for the adversary to keep a local copy of the messages it sees, if it so desires.
The following result on the security of protocol DW is shown in [CV16] . We include the proof in Appendix A.
Theorem 26. Let k, t, d Z and ǫ MAC , ǫ Ext , ǫ nmExt be parameters of Protocol DW, as specified in Figure 5 .1. Let nmExt be a (k, ǫ nmExt ) quantum-proof non-malleable extractor, Ext a strong (k−log d Z −log(1/ǫ Ext ), ǫ Ext ) quantum-proof extractor, and MAC an ǫ MAC -information-theoretically secure one-time message authentication code. Then for any active attack (ρ XE , T 1 , T 2 ) such that H min (X|E) ρ ≥ k, the DW privacy amplification protocol described in Figure 5 .1 is (k, m, ǫ)-secure as defined in Definition 23 with ǫ = O(ǫ Ext + ǫ nmExt + ǫ MAC ).
Combined with Theorem 1 stating the security of our construction of a quantum-proof non-malleable extractor, Theorem 26 provides a means to obtain privacy amplification protocol secure against active attacks for a range of parameters. Due to the limitations of our non-malleable extractor we are only able to extract from sources whose entropy rate is at least 1 2 . This is a typical setting in the case of quantum key distribution, where the initial min-entropy satisfies H min (X|E) ≥ α log d X for some constant α which depends on the protocol and the noise tolerance, but is generally larger than 3/4. Specifically, we obtain the following:
One-round Privacy Amplification Protocol
Let n, k be integers and ǫ > 0. Let v = n − k + log(1/ǫ) and m = (n/2) − v.
It is assumed that both parties, Alice and Bob, have access to a shared random variable X ∈ {0, 1} n . They interpret X as a pair X = (X 1 , X 2 ) where X 1 , X 2 are identified as elements in F 2 n/2 . Proof. Let p be a prime and n a positive integer such that log p = Θ(log(1/ǫ)) and d X = p n . Let d Y = p n/2 , and d Z = p. Also, let d 2 = O(log d X ), m = k − O(log(1/ǫ)), and t = O(log(1/ǫ)). We instantiate Theorem 26 with the following.
• Let Ext : {0, . . . , d X −1}×{0, 1} d2 → {0, 1} m be the (k−O(log(1/ǫ)), ǫ) strong quantum-proof extractor from Theorem 8.
• Let nmExt : {0, . . . , d X − 1} × {0, , . . . , d Y − 1} → {0, . . . , d Z − 1} be the ( 1 2 · log d X + O(log(1/ǫ)), ǫ) non-malleable extractor from Theorem 1.
• Let MAC : {0, . . . , d Z − 1} × {0, 1} d2 → {0, 1} t be the one-time ǫ-information-theoretically secure message authentication code from Proposition 25.
The result follows.
In this section we show that the one-round protocol of Dodis et al. [DKK + 12] is also quantum-proof. This protocol has significantly higher entropy loss, (n/2) + log(1/ǫ), than the DW protocol we presented in the previous section.
Theorem 28. For any integer n and k > n/2, and any ǫ > 0, the protocol in Figure 5 .2 is a one-round (k, m, ǫ)-quantum secure privacy amplification protocol with post-application robustness and entropy loss k − m = (n/2) + log(1/ǫ).
Proof. Correctness and extraction follow as in the classical proof by observing that Ext(X, Y ) = Y X 1 + X 2 is a quantum-proof extractor since h Y (X 1 , X 2 ) = Y X 1 + X 2 is a family of universal hash function, which is shown to be a quantum-proof strong extractor in [TSSR11] . For robustness, the classical proof does not generalize directly. We prove post-application robustness as follows.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose post-application robustness is violated, i.e. Pr[R A = R B ∧ R A =⊥ ∧ R B =⊥] > ǫ. Then there is an initial state ρ XE with H min (X|E) ρ ≥ k and a CPTP map T : L(H Y ⊗ H W ⊗ H RA ⊗ H E ) → L(H Y ⊗ H W ⊗ H E ′ ) that can be applied by an adversary Eve to produce a modified message that is accepted by Bob with probability greater than ǫ. Note that T has R A as input since we consider post-application robustness. Let (Y ′ , which has probability greater than ǫ · 2 −((n/2)−v) . On the other hand, we can upper bound the winning probability of the communication game using the min entropy assumption H(X|E) ρ ≥ k. Since Y is independent of X and the length of (W, R A ) is n/2, H min (X|E, Y, W ) ρ ≥ k−(n/2). Thus the winning probability is less than 2 −(k−(n/2)) . Putting the two calculations together we have ǫ · 2 −((n/2)−v) ≤ Pr[ Bob wins ] ≤ 2 −(k−(n/2)) , which implies v < n − k − log(1/ǫ), a contradiction.
A The Dodis-Wichs Protocol
In this appendix we reproduce the proof of Theorem 26, taken from [CV16] .
Proof of Theorem 26. Let an active attack on Protocol DW be specified by
